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Abstract
The Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia policy was a grand shift in focus for U.S.
foreign policy and sought to lay the foundation of U.S. policy in the region for the future. This
paper derives three fundamental assumptions that the Pivot policy was based upon, from the
articulations of the main architects of the Pivot Policy: former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. These assumptions are as follows, pivoting
to the Asia-Pacific will be beneficial to the U.S., engagement with China is central to the Pivot
policy and the policy is not an effort to contain China, and finally the draw down in the Middle
East will happen and the Pivot policy cannot happen without this draw down. Then, this paper
assesses whether they were realistic to presume. It is found that the foundation of the Pivot
policy was sound, but certain actions by they Obama Administration undermined these
assumptions and overall hurt the effectiveness of the Pivot policy.
1. Introduction
On November 17, 2011, former President Barack Obama officially launched what his
administration wished to be its most significant contribution to the history of United States
foreign affairs: the “Pivot” or “Rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific. As President Obama said in his
roll out speech to the Australian Parliament in Canberra, “After a decade in which we fought two
wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the
vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.”1 The President argued the United States was a “Pacific
Nation”2 and went on further to highlight the Asia-Pacific region’s growing importance in a
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global context, specifically in relation to the United States: “Here, we see the future. As the
world’s fastest-growing region and home to more than half the global economy—the Asia
Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that's creating jobs and opportunity for the
American people.”3 Due to this realization, the President prioritized a greater shift of resources
and attention to the region. This elevated this initiative to the core interests of the United States
and paramount importance to his administration.
There has been much debate about this massive policy shift to the Asia-Pacific region.
First, especially as the policy evolved, observers have considered whether the Pivot a success or
a failure? Was this the right time for the Pivot? Could America sustain this great of a resource
shift? Was the Obama administration pursuing the correct course of initiatives? Was its purpose
to contain China? All these questions are valid and must be answered due to the growing
importance of the region and the future of American involvement in it. This reflection is vital to
the growth and evolution of U.S. policy, as the Obama Administration correctly identified,
towards an increasingly important region in the world. Of equal importance to the debate is to
whether and what extent the Obama Administration, and the architects of the Pivot, could
correctly account for and predict the consequences, viability, and achievability of the core
premises of the Pivot.
This paper will seek to answer questions about these premises. Were the fundamental
assumptions that created the foundation of the Pivot policy sound? Did the Obama
Administration follow-up with actions and policies that were consistent with their premises? This
paper will be broken up into four parts that will determine whether and to what extent the
administration had a reason to believe its own premises underlying the Pivot policy. The first
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section is an examination of the promotion of the Pivot policy by the two main architects of it,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. From these two
central figures, the fundamental premises that the President and his Administration built the pivot
policy on will be determined. Following this, the paper will undertake a review of the main
debate within the Pivot to Asia literature was the pivot needed and was it a success or failure.
These assumptions will then then be analyzed to determine if they were sensible or if they were
flawed in some way. The final section will discuss what implications the findings of this paper
have on foreign policy as a whole.
2. The Pivot to Asia: Assumptions and Implementation
There are two parts to this section. The first will examine the principle advocates of the
pivot policy and the fundamental assumptions upon which the pivot policy was built. The second
will provide a brief overview of how the Administration operationalized the pivot in order to
achieve its goals. This highlights the two parts of policy formulation—justification for the policy
and actual implementation of the policy. This section will present a general overview of major
parts of the pivot policy as well as provide the subject of analysis for the rest of the piece by way
of the fundamental premises.
2.1 The Advocates: Clinton and Donilon
To determine the fundamental assumptions that guided the pivot towards its overall
goals, an examination of the writings of the main advocates of the pivot is required. The
following section will look at these two principal advocates of the Pivot–former Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton and former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. These two are the
most senior (beside the President) architects of the Pivot. They were charged by the
administration with defending the policy and helping America and the world understand its goals
3

and aspirations. Both of these two released comprehensive articulations of the Pivot that laid out
what it was seeking to achieve and how it would achieve its objectives.
Through these two official’s writings and promotion of the Pivot policy, three
fundamental assumptions are established in their writings. The first entails that, pivoting to Asia,
as opposed to other regions of the world, is the correct choice and will be beneficial for America.
The second is also two-fold—engagement with China is central to the success of the Pivot and
the Pivot is not a counter to China. Finally, the third one is two-fold, the United States will be
able to significantly decrease the resources it allocates to the Middle East (also known as a drawn
down), and the pivot cannot happen unless this draw down takes place. These assumptions
represent what the administration used to justify the Pivot, as well as some conditions necessary
for the pivot to have a reasonable chance of success. Analyzing these will help one determine if
these assumptions were realistic or unrealistic, or if there were variables that arose that the
administration could not have foreseen.
The pivot had been a priority for the Obama administration even since the campaign.4
However, the Pivot did not have an official rollout or accompanying policy document until the
2011 speech in Canberra. A month before that speech though, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
released an article in Foreign Policy titled “America’s Pacific Century”5, which can be
considered the best articulation of the Pivot to Asia.6 In it, Secretary Clinton argues America is at
a “pivot point” due to the drawn down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
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Administration’s desire to move away from the Middle East. She states that America must make
a choice of where it should “pivot” to next, which she then claims should be the Asia-Pacific.
She outlines six key actions that the United States will pursue in this policy shift: “strengthening
bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers,
including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and
investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human
rights.”7 The article was meant to officially articulate the Administration’s efforts in the region.
She attempts to convince the American people and the rest of the world, that the Pivot is a
necessary initiative for the United States to pursue.
The second piece is a speech given in 2013 by then National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon to The Asia Society in New York City, two years after Clinton’s article. Donilon’s
speech essentially reaffirmed many of the ideas discussed by Secretary Clinton in 2011, but was
an overall rebranding that sought to do away with the “pivot” connotation. He instead framed the
policy as a “re-balance” to Asia. He explains that America had “over weighted” its resources in
some regions and that the United States was going to “re-balance” its foreign policy to cover
other regions of the world. The most important of these regions is the Asia-Pacific.8 Donilon
stressed that the pivot is a foreign policy shift that will be permanent and that the United States
will be able to maintain this long-term transferal of resources. He spoke of five key pillars to the
American Pivot strategy, “strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging
powers; building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering
regional institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain
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shared prosperity.”9 These are similar to Clinton’s key actions, but are somewhat revised to
address specific concerns that critics were voicing about the Pivot at the time.
These two pieces represent the Administration and are the best articulations of the goals
and principles of pivot policy. These comprehensive pieces were given by the highest
government officials associated with it that were not the President Secretary Clinton’s article is
the first real effort at this and is a comprehensive overview of the Pivot strategy. Donilon’s
speech marks a rhetorical shift of the Pivot policy due to the rebranding as a “rebalance”, but
maintains the same rudimentary objectives and principles first outlined by Secretary Clinton two
years prior.
The first assumption, pivoting to Asia, specifically Asia, is the correct choice and is
beneficial for America. Secretary Clinton spends the first section of her article explaining why
America should pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and what the region offers that would benefit
American interests. Right away in the second paragraph Clinton says, “The Asia-Pacific has
become a key driver of global politics…It [the Asia-Pacific] boasts almost half of the world’s
populations. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest
emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several if our key allies and important emerging
powers like China, India, and Indonesia.”10 She also details how America and the Asia-Pacific
region became deeply linked through workforce and student sharing.11
Through this, the Secretary argues that the Asia-Pacific region will become the center for
every aspect of the international system, through security, economics, and diplomacy. Thus, it
would be rational for the United States to begin investing in the various forms of infrastructure in
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this increasingly important region, since the international political center of gravity in shifting
towards it. As Clinton put it, “A strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global
effort to secure and sustain America’s overall global leadership.”12
Donilon supports and builds upon Clinton’s manifestation of this assumption. He cites
the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region and offers the prediction that “over
the next five years, nearly half of all the [economic] growth outside of the United States is
expected to come from Asia.”13 Due to this, he states, “…Asia’s future and the future of the
United States are deeply and increasingly linked.”14
Both Clinton and Donilon see the Asia-Pacific region, becoming one of, if not the, most
important region in the world both economically and diplomatically. This growth will benefit
America in every way and requires America’s attention, leadership, and resources. Both argue
that this leadership will bring stability (through all tools in the American foreign policy toolbox,
military, economic, and diplomatic) and growth that will benefit all parties. This is why America
needed to make this turn now before the rules continued to be shaped without American
involvement. Through this reasoning, Clinton and Donilon argue the first assumption of the
pivot, the correct move is pivoting to the Asia-Pacific region and this will benefit America.
The second assumption that the Administration placed under the pivot has two main
parts. The first is, China is central to the success of the pivot. The second, the Pivot is not a
counter to China. Secretary Clinton, when laying out the six goals of the Pivot, specifically
points out China as one of the emerging powers that the United States will work with. She says,
“…deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China…”15
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While earlier in the piece she does name India and Indonesia as other budding nations that the
United States must work with, special attention is paid to China. Clinton spends an entire two
pages discussing China specifically and its role in the context of the Pivot. She starts out by
saying, “China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships
the United States has ever had to manage.”16 This, compared to just three-quarters of a page
outlining how India and Indonesia fit into the Pivot, combined.
Donilon doubles down on the centrality of China in the Pivot. One of the five pillars of
the American strategy of the Pivot involves “…building a stable, productive, and constructive
relationship with China.”17 He then spends a good chunk of time outlining the importance of the
Chinese relationship in the Pivot. He goes on to say, “The President places great importance on
this relationship because there are few diplomatic, economic or security challenges in the world
that can be addressed without China at the table and without a broad, productive, and
constructive relationship between our countries.”18 This further reinforces how critical the
Administration considers China to the overall success of the Pivot policy.
While Clinton and Donilon both spend large amounts of time asserting the importance of
China in the Pivot, they also zealously affirm that the Pivot is not an attempt to counter China’s
rise in the region, the second part of the China assumption for the Pivot. In the first official
rollout of the Pivot, Secretary Clinton states, “Some in our country see China’s progress as a
threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China’s growth.
We reject both those views.”19 Here she flat out rejects the notion that the United States feels
threatened by the rise of China. She goes on to support this rejection throughout the article by
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accentuating the prosperity of both nations is in the absolute best interest of the United States and
China. She continues to speak of engagement with China through bi-lateral and multi-lateral
means, rather than confrontation, in order to counter the impression that the United States strives
to contain China.
By the time Donilon articulates his advocacy for the Pivot, critics still claim that the Pivot
is an attempt to contain China.20 Donilon addresses this issue again by stating that it is of the
things that the re-balance is not “… [The Pivot does not] mean containing China or seeking to
dictate terms in Asia.”21 Donilon rejects the idea that a rising power and an established power are
doomed to conflict and says that there is nothing “preordained about such outcomes.”22 He used
much of the same engagement language that Secretary Clinton used to the further reinforce that
the U.S. does not seek to contain China. He emphasizes that both the United States and China are
working together to form a positive relationship to tackle the world’s problems.23
The Administration both directly and indirectly goes to great lengths to make China a
central part of the pivot policy and to dispel the theory that the United States is attempting to
contain such an integral part of the pivot. They devote large sections of their dictions of the Pivot
to addressing the benefits and challenges that the United States faces with China. Overall, they
see engagement with China as a vital premise that must be fulfilled to achieve success with the
Pivot.
The final premise is one that the pivot relies upon for success and one that must be
achieved to be able to fully commit to the Pivot. This assumption is that the United States is
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going to draw down its presence in the Middle East, and this will free up resources to be used for
the pivot policy. Both Clinton and Donilon seem confident that the United States will be able to
pull out of the Middle East and both stress that the pivot can happen because the United States is
going to be able to draw its presence down in the Middle East region.
The first part of this assumption, the United States will be able to drawn down its
resources in the Middle East, neither Clinton nor Donilon even address America’s ability to
substantially withdrawn from this region. They both speak of the draw down as an inevitable
fact, rather than a hope of possibility. In the first sentence of Clinton’s piece, she speaks absolute
terms: “As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from
Afghanistan, the United States at a Pivot point.”24 The war in Iraq is winding down and the
America is withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.
Donilon frames his articulation of this argument in the context of America having an
“over-weight” of interests in other regions (he names the Middle East specifically),25 and that
these resources must be “re-balanced” to other regions of the world. He speaks in terms of
absolutes as well, just like Secretary Clinton. America will be able to shift resources away from
other regions and appropriate them to the Asia-Pacific. Both Clinton and Donilon speak of the
drawn down from the Middle East as imminent, straightforward, and permanent. This draw down
is what marked the “pivot” point or for a “rebalance”. The Middle East was the primary foreign
policy focus of the U.S for a decade. The Obama Administration now wanted to make the AsiaPacific that focus.
The second part of the Middle East assumption, that the pivot cannot happen without the
drawn down is also expressed in this manner by Clinton and Donilon. Both emphasize that a
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shift in the focus of American foreign policy is predicated by a decrease of focus and resources
form the Middle East. They argue this because resources have been pre-occupied by the wars of
the Middle East for the better part of a decade and should be allocated elsewhere in the world.
Secretary Clinton says, “Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those
two theaters,” and that America must be “…smart and systematic about where we invest time
and energy.”26 Donilon, again framing it in terms of the “re-balance”, says that the “overweighting” of U.S. resources in other regions (citing the Middle East), is an inefficient use of
them and they can be better utilized in other parts of the world. Both Clinton and Donilon argue
that the United States needs to re-allocate its resources away from regions that hurt America (the
Middle East) and towards regions the benefit America (the Asia-Pacific). Without these
resources, there really can be no Pivot or re-balance, because there would be nothing to rebalance.
These three assumptions and their subparts were fundamental for the justification and
success of the Pivot as articulated by the two primary advocates of the Administration for the
pivot policy. They are structural to the integrity of the Pivot overall, because they lay the
foundation that the Pivot policy is then operationalized upon. Sections four through six will take
these assumptions individually and see if the administration was correct to make that assumption.
In addition, it certain policy actions relating to these premises will be evaluated to see how they
affected these premises. Were the assumptions realistic or unrealistic, or were variables that
arose that the administration could not have foreseen?
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2.2 The Pivot in Action
In order to achieve the goals and aspirations of the pivot policy, the Obama
Administration implemented a multidimensional strategy that had three components: diplomatic,
economic, and security. The pivot policy was designed to employ all the foreign policy tools at
the disposal of the United States to deepen relations, influence, and involvement in the AsiaPacific region in ways that would ultimately benefit the United States.
The first dimension of the pivot was diplomatic. The Obama Administration sought to
expand American involvement in Asia-Pacific’s multilateral institutions, as well as further
develop bi-lateral relationships within the region. The Obama Administration broadened its
engagement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by signing the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2009, appointing the first resident U.S. ambassador to
ASEAN, and seeking Economic Support Fund (ESF) funding for ASEAN and other regional
ASEAN programs.27 President Obama capped this off by hosting an ASEAN Summit in
February 2016, the first time the United States has ever hosted one. Additionally, the Obama
Administration sought to expand its collaboration in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), hosting a meeting in 2011, to complement its growing work in ASEAN.28 Finally, the
Obama Administration joined the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is one of the region’s
foremost multinational organizations,29 and promised never to miss a “head of state” meeting of
the body. Joining EAS helped underscore the Administration’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific
region.
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To strengthen bi-lateral relationships, the Obama Administration focused on
strengthening existing, long standing relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Australia while building upon a plethora of fledging relationships with Indonesia, India,
Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma. The stalwarts of U.S.-Asian alliances, South Korea
and Japan, received assurances of America’s continuing commitment and the U.S. bolstered
military cooperation, trade, and diplomatic efforts. Tom Donilon considered the Japanese-U.S.
alliance as the “cornerstone” of Asian security.”30 He pointed to U.S.-Japanese cooperation after
the Fukishima disaster and the excellent relationship between President Obama and Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a sign of strengthened ties between the two countries. South Korea
received similar assurances of solidarity as well as a deepening of trade ties in the form of the
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Meanwhile, the United States and Australia agreed to a
rotation of U.S. marines in Darwin and promised to work together towards continued prosperity
and regional security.
The Obama Administration also focused on building bi-lateral relationships with
emerging countries in the region. Most notable is India, which the Obama Administration
brought into the Asia-Pacific fold. High-level meetings with both heads of state were held, a 10year defense framework was signed,31 a joint climate change action plan was revealed,32 and
both worked in ASEAN to facilitate trade. In addition to India, the United States built up ties
with Indonesia by developing the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,33 while working
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with Indonesia in other Asian multi-lateral institutions. Indonesia was the country that invited the
United States into EAS, further showing the commitment of the two nations to work together.
The Obama Administration further reinforced ties with countries like Thailand and the
Philippines through counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance. Rapprochement with Burma
and a thawing of relations with Vietnam further demonstrates the Obama Administration’s broad
diplomatic approach to the pivot.
The second dimension of the pivot is economic. Although there were many smaller
economic efforts and agreements made bi-laterally (trade agreements with South Korea and
Singapore),34 the main component of the economic dimension of the pivot policy was the TransPacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was one of the central operational pillars of the pivot policy
and essentially, the entirety of the economic dimension rested upon its success. Kurt Campbell,
who served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs between 2009 and
2013, describes the importance of the TPP as “…the true sine qua non of the Pivot.”35 The TPP
was a free-trade agreement between twelve countries around the Pacific Rim.36 Lead by the
United States, the countries of the TPP made up 40% of the global economic output.37 The
design of the TPP was to promote further integration of the Pacific Rim economies and to ease
the flow of goods and services between them. The creation of this common market tackled a
range of economic issues from tariffs, quotas, intellectual property rights, labor standards and
many more.38
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The final dimension of the pivot policy was security focused. It involved shifts in the
priorities and resources of the American military. Under the pivot policy, the Department of
Defense would put greater importance on the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama administration
believed that an American military presence is vital to maintaining security in the region.39 There
were three features of this plan. The first is a broader distribution of forces throughout the AsiaPacific, primarily to the southern part of the region. The focus of the United States security
efforts in the Asia-Pacific has been concentrated in the Northern region due to the threat of North
Korea. The pivot sought to spread that focus to areas like the India Ocean, Southeast Asia, and
the Strait of Malacca.
The second feature is increased flexibility towards deployments that would make
American forces more agile and responsive.40 Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
announced in 2012 that the United States Navy was to shift 60 percent of its fleet to the AsiaPacific region by 2020.41 This feature in the pivot policy’s security dimension also incorporates
Air-Sea Battle doctrine which seeks to help “meet the challenges of new and disruptive
technologies and weapons that could deny our forces access to key sea routes and key lines of
communication.”42 Forward deployment of forces to bases like Guam and Diego Garcia, and the
incorporation of Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships into the naval fleet represented an effort to
increase the flexibility and responsiveness of American security forces.
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The final feature of the security dimension of the pivot involved enhancing partner
capabilities through training and the strengthening of security alliances.43 The rotation of U.S.
marines to Australia, the agreement to deploy littoral combat ships to Singapore, the defense
partnership with India, and the desire to increase joint-training exercises with many AsianPacific nations are a few examples of efforts in this feature. The Obama Administration wanted
to “ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.”44
The three dimensions the Obama Administration took to implement the pivot policy only
emphasizes the vast scope of it. There were countless number of gears turning at every level of
government to put the policy into action. It was a thorough engagement of every foreign policy
tool available to the United States government, just as Secretary Clinton had said it would be.
The first half of this section laid out the three of the fundamental assumptions of the pivot policy
that laid the groundwork for the operationalization of the pivot policy. The second half of the
section then described the major policy actions the Obama Administration did to implement the
pivot policy that gained tangible results. The next section will now review the literature
regarding the Pivot to Asia and will examine the debates about its success, failure, and
feasibility.
3. Literature Review
The Pivot or “Rebalance” to Asia was an extensive and broad shift in American foreign
policy that mobilized every foreign policy tool in the President’s toolbox. Due to this, it is
reasonable there was much debate about what implications a grand shift in policy may bring.
Some of these revolve around some central questions: Can the United States maintain such a
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commitment as envisioned by the Obama Presidency? Is the Administration going about the
pivot in the right way? Is this to contain a rising China, or is the shift purely benign? Was the
Pivot even feasible or necessary at all? Ultimately, all these questions lead to a central debate:
Was the pivot a success or a failure? This section will examine the many facets of this debate and
the consensus reached by commentators and scholars concerning the pivot policy.
In lieu of the initial rollout of the pivot policy by Secretary Clinton, the debate
surrounding the pivot policy started out as an inquiry as to whether the pivot was necessary and
analyzed the initial rhetoric of the policy. This debate prompted the rhetorical shift of a
“rebalance” rather than a “pivot”, which Tom Donilon articulated. After this rhetorical shift,
concrete results started to emerge from the pivot policy. The debate then evolved into one that
flowed into three different categories: the pivot was a success, the pivot was a failure, and the
pivot was a mixed bag of results. While the debate about the pivot policy does not follow this
rhetorical shift neatly, there were those that were criticizing the few early actions of the Pivot
prior to Donilon. However, debate on the actual pivot in action generally did not take place until
after the rhetorical rebranding.
The first section below will present an overview of the initial debate of the pivot, its
rhetoric and necessity. The second section will focus on the evolution of this debate, and offer an
overview of arguments made by those who suggested that the pivot is/was (some of these pieces
were written during the “pivot years”) a success. Discussions of those who argue that the pivot
was a failure and those who argue it was a mixed bag of results will follow the same format as
the first section as well. Strands of continuity within each camp will also be examined along with
similarities between all three groups.
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3.1 The Initial Debate
After the rollout of the pivot policy, one of the immediate concerns of foreign policy
scholars was what is going to happen to the Middle East? In his piece written in 2012,45 Javier
Solana, former secretary general of NATO and former minister of foreign affairs of Spain, warns
of this foreign policy dilemma that America put itself into by initiating the pivot policy. He
describes this dilemma in terms of having to choose between shifting focus to the Asia-Pacific or
keeping that focus in the Middle East, which at the time was still experiencing great unrest.
Solana points to a number of issues in the Middle East that are still taxing the foreign policy
resources of the U.S. The increasing violence in Gaza, instability in Iraq, and the Iran nuclear
issue are all examples he uses to illustrate the continued use of American resources in the Middle
East, rather than in the Asia-Pacific. Solana raises the question of whether the United States can
maintain this balancing act and if it will have to choose between the two. Solana argues that
while the Obama Administration wants to make the Asia-Pacific its top foreign policy agenda,
issues in the Middle East will continue to prevent that.46 This fact will then diminish the
effectiveness of the pivot policy overall.
Martin Indyk, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel from 1995 to 1997 and executive vicepresident of the Brookings Institution, argues in line with Solana in his 2012 Foreign Policy
piece “The Re-Pivot.” In it, Indyk argues that Obama is leaving the Middle East too early and
doing so will leave issues like the increasing Gaza violence and the Iran nuclear issue in
dangerous states.47 Pivoting to Asia at this time would take away valuable resources, such as
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high-level diplomatic officials, that are needed to resolve these conflicts. Indyk is not against the
pivot policy per se; what he is against is the timing of the pivot. Indyk wants the big issues in the
Middle East dealt with before Obama commits the resources necessary for the pivot policy.
Robert Ross, a professor of political science at Boston College who has taught in several
American and Chinese universities on East Asian Security, argues that the issue is not pivoting to
Asia and away from another region, but that the entire policy is counterproductive and
unnecessary.48 China is the most important player in the region. China and the United States
have not always had the greatest of relationships and during the early years of the pivot,
increasing concerns of an aggressively rising China were returning to the forefront of foreign
policy analysis. Ross argues that this grand pivot policy only worsens China’s latent anxieties of
domination by a foreign power. This is then counterproductive to the stated goals of the pivot
because it will only make China more aggressive and will make surrounding countries weary of
what will happen between the U.S. and China. This will then make these countries more hesitant
about working with the United States. Ross says that the United States needs to maintain a high
level of engagement with China to quell these anxieties and achieve success in the AsiaPacific.49
There were also those who supported the idea of the pivot policy and the need for
increased attention in the Asia-Pacific. Will Inboden, executive director of the Williams P.
Clements, Jr. Center at UT-Austin, called the pivot policy “The Obama Administration’s most
significant success” for foreign policy in 2011.50 Inboden says that the actual creation of an Asia
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Pacific grand strategy could have the “…potential to pay dividends for a generation.”51 Inboden
does worry about the U.S. ability to commit to such a grand strategy in the long-term, as well as
the domestic political will to do the same. Overall, Inboden says that the United States cannot
afford to put so much focus on specific regions like the Middle East while it can take steps to
increase influence in other regions of the world, such as the Asia-Pacific.52
Leon Hadar of the CATO Institute also takes the general position of Inboden, that the
shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific is good but time will tell if it is successful or not.53 Hadar says
that the Bush administration’s fixation on the Middle East and the War on Terror hurt relations
with the Asia-Pacific and that this was a detriment the U.S. as a whole. Hadar welcomes the shift
in focus to the Asia-Pacific but warns that the United States still has commitments in the Middle
East and must play a role in them.54 To close his piece Hadar offers one final word of caution
about the timing of the pivot policy. He questions the potential effectiveness of the pivot policy
when the Middle East draw down was just starting to take effect. As Hadar puts it, “America's
Pacific Century, alluring as it is, may have to wait.”55
3.2 The Second Pivot Policy Debate
Once more tangible results started to emerge from the pivot policies initiatives, the debate
over the pivot policy moved into that regarding its general success or failure. Michael Fuchs,
former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2013-2016
(among various other State Department roles he served in before), in the New Republic, argued
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that the pivot was primarily a success because it laid the necessary foundation for future U.S.
policy in the region. In his words, “… the Obama administration has established the groundwork
for a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy in the coming decades.”56 Fuchs focuses on the
success of the diplomatic dimension of the pivot. He praised the United States for joining the
East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2010, which Fuchs says may not be as “earth-shattering” as other
initiatives but it is extremely significant because it gave the United States a voice and opened
avenues of cooperation within the border region.57
Fuchs also praises the Obama Administration for consistently showing up to these
multilateral meetings, even when other crises were happening around the world, specifically
citing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton leaving the 2012 East Asia Summit to broker a peace
between Gaza and Israel.58 All of these events improved the credibility of the United States’
claim that it was serious about committing to the region. To strengthen his assertion that the
diplomatic dimension was successful, Fuchs points out the improvement of relations with nations
such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Malaysia, all of which have been historical unfriendly
towards the United States. Finally, Fuchs concludes by showing how opinion polls recording
favorable views of the United States in Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all gone up
significantly between 2007 and 2015.59
Fuchs does discuss how the challenges the pivot is facing, tensions with China that have
not improved, troubles with the TPP due to domestic concerns, and the fact that the United States
did not join the Chinese lead Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) were factors
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hurting the pivot at the time of his writing. However, as an aggregate, the pivot is succeeding in
improving American engagement in the region and laying a foundation for future work in areas
in which the pivot challenged, specifically in regards to China.
Following the same basic argument, Doyle McManus of The Los Angeles Times
Washington Bureau, also argues that the pivot is working because it is laying important
infrastructure for sustainable American engagement within the region. McManus underscores the
fact that other nations are “…clamoring for a closer relationship with the United States.”60 What
comes out in his argument is that the Obama Administration is capitalizing on the fear countries
in the region have for a rising China, and that this is pushing them in the direction of the United
States. He specifically uses the example of Vietnam and its rapprochement with the United
States out of concerns about China.
McManus is among the camp that believes one of the goals of the pivot was to balance
and counter China’s rise within the region. In this regard the United States is winning due to its
“…asymmetric advantage of its own: its ability to forge stronger alliances with China’s worried
neighbors.”61 This strengthening of relationships in the region raises “the long-term costs to
Beijing”62 in regards to carving out a sphere of influence. This translates to a success in the grand
scheme of foreign policy, according to McManus. He does give a nod to the fact that if the Trans
Pacific Partnership (TPP) is failing this will hurt the overall success of the pivot. This failure
would be a win for China but he does not spend much time on the subject.
One of the biggest advocates of the Pivot to Asia was President Obama’s former National
Security Advisor, Tom Donilon. Donilon was one of the principle architects of the pivot and his

60

Doyle McManus, “Obama’s Pivot to Asia is Working,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2016.
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-pivot-asia-china-aggression-20160522-snap-story.html
61
Ibid., 2016.
62
Ibid., 2016.

22

advocacy of the pivot while he was in the White House was more closely examined in the
previous section. He does continue to defend the pivot even after his tenure in the White House.
In an opinion piece he wrote for the Washington Post, he asserts that “the rebalancing of U.S.
priorities and resources toward Asia remains the right strategy.”63 He contends that the purpose
behind the pivot was to “rebalance” America’s priorities to a region that is of increasing
importance, thus laying the groundwork for future commitments to the region by the United
States.
In keeping with the two previous authors, Donilon focuses on the diplomatic successes,
drawing attention away from the military dimension and the struggle of the economic dimension
by way of the TPP. He maintains the continued diplomatic successes and steady work to ensure
the success of the TPP will bring the United States and Asia security and prosperity. This
supports the Administration’s vision that Asia in the twenty-first century “defined not by conflict
but by security and prosperity.”64
Supporters of the pivot contend that the main goal of the policy is to lay a foundation for
future American engagement within the Asia-Pacific. They tend to focus on the immediate
successes of the diplomatic dimension of the pivot and the increasing cooperation between the
United States and other nations of the region. Some proponents discuss some of the challenges
that the pivot is facing (like the TPP negotiations) and some failures of it (like the inability to
stop Chinese aggression and land disputes). However, the argument is the creation of this
foundation outweighs those concerns and they can be addressed down the road due to the
relationships forged through the pivot policy.
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Now that there has been an overview of those arguing the success of the Pivot, let us look
at those who claim the opposite. John Ford, a U.S. Army Captain who studied at Peking
University, calls Obama’s Pivot to Asia his “greatest foreign policy mistake.”65 He claims that
the focus of the pivot sacrificed attention to other parts of the world and that the assumptions of
it are flawed. The assumptions he identifies are: the U.S. policy had ignored the Asia region, that
the importance of the region called for a military strategy, and that the United States could pull
out other regions of the world.
Ford then discusses how each assumption was flawed. The United States has always
engaged the Asia region, specifically citing the previous administration’s efforts in ChinaTaiwan relations, a civilian nuclear agreement with India, trade agreements with various
countries in the region, and working relations with Pakistan. He contends that the security
dimension was unnecessary and counter-productive it increased Chinese anxieties and caused
them to become more aggressive in the region. He even questions the point of having a security
aspect at all, “The premise of the pivot was that Asia was more important relative to other parts
of the world because it was home to a rising proportion of global GDP and was now at the center
of the world economy.”66 He finally concludes with the administration’s further withdrawal from
the Middle East, which led too much of the ensuing conflict that followed. He also points to the
move away from Europe and how, in his opinion, that emboldened Russia to entertain its
endeavors in Ukraine and Crimea.
Dan Blumenthal, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and
former senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense, follows
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many of John Ford’s arguments by way that the Obama administration was focusing too much
on just Asia, and taking its eyes off the rest of the world. The pivot was a “strategic
misconception”67 because the United States is a global power and Asia is more globally
connected. Thus, any Asia policy must not look at Asia as a black box. As Blumenthal put it,
“There can be no Asia policy without a global strategy.”68 He goes on further to argue that
Obama may have been a tad too ambitious with the Pivot to Asia and should, “…settle for
something more mundane: building on the Asia work of his predecessors.”69
Simon Tisdall, assistant director of The Guardian, takes a similar approach to the pivot,
but he frames the failure in regards to its attempt to contain China. Tisdall contends that the pivot
is an effort by the United States to use all of its foreign policy tools in a bid to contain China and
ensure a peaceful rise.70 The TPP being in trouble (by not including China), growing wariness of
allies about U.S. commitment in the region, and the administration’s inability to curb Chinese
aggression in the South China Sea have all contributed to the failure of the pivot, according to
Tisdall. He also draws on the new Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte’s, shift towards China
to strengthen his argument. This shift by Duterte, he argues, represents a growing wariness of
U.S. commitment among Asian states that is working in China’s favor by pushing them towards
China. He concludes his piece by taking a classic realist perspective on the area and U.S. efforts
in the region. He contends that the failure of the pivot will only hasten the eventual conflict
between the U.S. and China. Robert Ross complements Tisdall’s argument. Ross follows the
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same assertion that one of the primary goals of the pivot was meant to check the rising China,
but instead “…has sparked its combativeness and damaged its faith in cooperation.”71
Those that flat out call the pivot a failure mainly point to the increased tension between
the U.S. and China caused by the security dimension and its inability to curb Chinese aggression
in various areas of the region, mainly the South China Sea. They also point out the trouble of the
TPP (which eventually failed) and the neglect of the rest of the world by the Obama
Administration, especially for a policy that was supposed to “re-balance” American
commitments globally. With most of the attention paid to the military and economic dimensions
of the pivot, these critics failed to adequately consider the diplomatic dimension of the Pivot.
This failure implies that the critics did not believe the successes of the diplomatic dimension
outweighed the failures of the economic and security dimensions.
Finally, there are those who view the pivot as a mixed bag of results that has its successes
and failures. Mike Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, is one such person. He argues that there are four highlights of
the legacy of the pivot. These highlights include a significant achievement: laying the
groundwork for engagement in the Southeast Asia region, one sub-par performance: the
management of great power relations in North Asia, one lost opportunity: trade and the TPP, and
finally one that was left dangerously incomplete: North Korea.72
Green takes a more even-handed approach in his analysis of the pivot. He praises the
Obama Administration’s efforts in a re-balance between North Asia and Southeast Asia by way
of increased involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and joining
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the East Asia Summit. He says the administration should be lauded for laying the “overdue
framework for engagement with this increasingly important sub-region.”73 Similarly, he
continues to point out the success of the Administration’s diplomatic efforts with great powers,
but criticizes the handling of China. He does note that there were “exogenous factors” like the
2006 financial crisis and the leadership change from the mild-mannered Hu Jintao to the tougher
Xi Jinping, which contributed the flaring of these tensions, but that the administration did not
recover well.
While offering successes, Green presents failures as well. This is mainly in the form of
the increasing trouble that the TPP is facing and the deteriorated situation in North Korea. Green
thinks more could have been done with trade and that domestic pressures seem to have doomed
the agreement. In regards to North Korea, Green is fair to say that no administration has handed
off North Korea better than what they found it, and that the Obama Administration is no
different. Green sums up his point a view quite nicely, “This is not the worst Asia legacy or the
best in recent history. There are elements to build on but also areas that need to be fixed.
Understanding that will help the next administration.”74
Kenneth Lieberthal, who is senior fellow emeritus in the Foreign Policy program and the
Brookings Institution and was former special assistant to the president for national security
affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council from 1998 to 2000, takes an
approach similar approach to Green’s in identifying points of success, failure, and challenges of
the pivot. Lieberthal argues that trade, the handling of China, domestic issues, and the strong
push of American values have all hurt the record of the pivot. However, he gives credit for the
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diplomatic initiatives that Obama has pursued and ultimately the pivot “…establishes a more
balanced economic, diplomatic, and security approach.”75
Fareed Zakaria, a journalist for CNN and a columnist for The Washington Post, questions
the commitment of the United States to the pivot in his Washington Post op-ed in 2015. While he
does heavily criticize some of the Obama Administration’s decisions throughout the pivot, he
also implies that the grand strategy is not a bad idea. Zakaria’s main point is to shine light on the
various crises happening around the world that were pulling Obama and his team away from
Asia, prompting the title of his piece: “Whatever happened to Obama’s Pivot to Asia?” He
questions Obama’s decision on the AIIB, his handling of China, and the fact that the TPP is in
quite a bit of trouble. What Zakaria does say, though, that may reassure the legitimacy of the
pivot as a whole: “The Obama administration needs to start believing in its own grand
strategy…Washington should focus its energies, attention and efforts on Asia.”76 This shows that
Zakaria may ultimately support the idea of the pivot and that it can work if Obama keeps his eyes
on the ball and is able to fix the problems it does have.
Those who argued that the pivot is a mixed bag of results incorporate the successes that
the pro-pivot advocates and the failures that the critics point out. The diplomatic dimension of
the pivot is definitely the strongest part of the strategy, but the success does in this area does not
outweigh the mistakes and challenges that are facing the pivot. This group argues that more work
needs to be done to ensure greater success of the pivot but that it is making a good effort at
establishing a good framework going forward.
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Out of all of the literature on this subject, there seems to be consensus that is drawn, even
if one disagrees on the overall success or failure of the pivot. The first is that the pivot is
succeeding in the establishment of the foundation for future engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region. Second, the economic portion of the pivot is proving to be challenging. If you are on the
pro-pivot side, this challenge can be overcome and the benefits will be enormous. If one is a
critic of the pivot, this will not be overcome and it will hurt America in the end. For the third and
final point, China continues to be an issue and the United States is struggling to find a balance
between engagement and holding China accountable for its aggression and pressure in the
region. Overall, all sides of the debate seem to be furthering the assertion that Obama’s Pivot to
Asia is indeed a mixed bag of results that has its successes and failures. It just depends on which
part one wishes to focus on.
4. Growth and Opportunity
The first basic premise of the Pivot to Asia is that turning to the Asia-Pacific will benefit
the United States. Was this a safe assumption though? Both Clinton and Donilon point to the
potential economic and diplomatic benefits of the region.77 Was the Asia Pacific region going to
provide the economic and diplomatic benefit that the Obama Administration had anticipated?
Based on economic data of the Asia-Pacific Region in 2011, such as aggregate Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), GDP growth, FDI inflows and outflows, as well as the growing influence of the
region in international politics, the first premise of the pivot policy was rational for the
Administration to make. The Asia-Pacific region had the potential to benefit the United States in
ways that warranted an increase of focus on the region.
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As Secretary Clinton noted in her 2011 piece, the Asia-Pacific region is home to a large
portion of the global economy. As seen in Figure 4.1, the East Asia & Pacific region is among
the regions with the highest GDP globally. By 2009, East Asia as a region over took the United
States in terms of GDP and then the European Union not long after in 2010. The East Asia &
Pacific region has maintained its prominence at the top of the GDP chart into 2016. In the same
figure, the South Asian region’s GDP increased over the course of the 2000s to come in just
under the resource rich nations of the Middle East and North Africa.78. By 2016, the South Asia
region is poised to overtake the Middle East and North Africa in terms of GDP.79 Furthermore, in
2011 both the East Asia & Pacific and the South Asia regions accounted for $21.906 trillion of
the $73.242 trillion global GDP.80 That is just shy of 30% of global GDP. In 2016, that share
rose to $25.373 trillion of $75.544 trillion, or just over 33% of the global GDP.
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Figure 4.1 Gross Domestic Product (In Trillions of Current US$)
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In terms of aggregate GDP, the Asia-Pacific region holds a large share of the global
GDP. Does this dominance hold true for growth in GDP growth as well? Figure 4.2 shows the
annual percent growth in GDP for every major region in the world since 2000. For the most part,
South Asia has had the highest GDP growth rate of all other regions since 2000 (mostly due to
India). The East Asia & Pacific region steadily rose to become the second-fastest growing region
by 2011, right behind South Asia. After 2011, the two Asia-Pacific regions continued to
maintain their superior growth in relation to other regions, remaining first and second places,
respectively, in terms of growth in 2016.
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Figure 4.2 GDP Growth (Annual %) 2000-2016
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The recovery of these two regions after the 2008 recession also speaks to their economic
power. Both regions in the Asia-Pacific recovered from the recession much quicker than other
regions and were able to ascend past pre-recession levels of growth faster as well. Growth for the
region did dip in 2011 and leveled off at a rate lower than pre-recession levels, both regions
maintained higher growth than the rest of the world by 2016.
In terms of total GDP and GDP growth rate, the Asia-Pacific region has performed better
than other regions of the world. While the Asia Pacific region is vast and differs from other
regions in terms of resources, geography, capital, culture, and other economic factors that may
contribute to the differences in economic strength, the previous decade showed a steady increase
in the share of global GDP by the Asia Pacific region. When the pivot policy was formulated and
rolled out in 2011, this trend had held strong (even through the 2008 recession). Given this
decade-long trend and post-recession recovery, it could have been reasonable for the Obama
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Administration and the architects of the pivot policy to believe that the Asia-Pacific region
would remain strong economically compared to other regions of the world. This strength could
then provide more opportunities for American investment than that offered by other regions.
Clinton and Donilon not only believed that the Asia-Pacific would remain strong
economically, but they also believed that this economic potency would provide opportunities for
American and Asian businesses to grow as well. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) are
another indicator of the economic strength of the Asia-Pacific region and its potential benefit to
the United States. FDI has its negatives and positives,81 but overall high inflows of it can be a
good indicator of growth and economic strength of a country or region. Countries with high
inflows of FDI, meaning foreign entities investing capital and technology to expand business
operations and access the market within that country, show that foreign investors see business
opportunities, potential growth, and low risk within that country or region. While inflow of FDI
is generally considered more beneficial for the recipient country, specifically developing ones,82
high outflows of FDI from a country can also show strength in the economy of a country.
Outflows of FDI are the other side of the coin of FDI inflows. FDI outflow is when domestic
businesses are investing abroad to expand operations and their access to markets. High outflows
of FDI are a sign that domestic businesses are doing well enough to have excess capital to invest
abroad and can be an indicator of an overall stronger economy.
The Asia-Pacific region has seen strong performance in both inflows and outflows of
FDI. Figure 1.3 shows the net inflows of FDI for the major regions of the world and the United
States since 2000. As one can see, the amount of FDI invested in the East Asia region has been
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steadily increasing since 2004, and East Asia has been among the top three recipient regions of
FDI. By 2011 and the roll out of the Pivot, the Asia-Pacific region was experiencing its largest
increase of inflow of FDI since the recession.83 This trend continued after 2011, which shows the
retention of investor confidence in the region. East Asia, specifically China, does account for a
large portion of the FDI inflows in the Asia-Pacific region. However, considering that China is
the largest or second largest trading partner for a majority of Asian-Pacific countries,84 it has a
profound influence on the economies of surrounding countries and a strong Chinese economy
can be beneficial for the region.

Figure 4.3 Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, In Billions
of Current US$)
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FDI inflows into the region did decline sharply in 2016, but this is not a phenomenon
specific to the Asia-Pacific. Global FDI fell by 13% in 2016, with some regions faring better
than others did.85 This decrease does not undermine the Obama Administration’s formulation of
the first assumption, since global FDI inflows decreased. Also, at the time of the formulation of
the pivot policy, inflows of FDI into the Asia-Pacific were on the rise, which could have given
the Administration a reasonable belief that the trend would continue (which it did). This would
then contribute to the overall growth of the Asia-Pacific region, growth that the pivot architects
wanted America and its businesses to benefit from.
In addition to having a global trend of investment into the Asia-Pacific region, American
companies were also increasing their investment into the region at a greater rate when compared
to other regions of the world. Figure 1.4 shows the U.S. direct investment positions abroad on a
historical cost basis between 2000 and 2016. Since 2000, the Asia-Pacific has been the second or
third region that U.S. companies invest in the most. The growth in American FDI to the AsiaPacific has steadily increased at a constant rate for over a decade and even continued postrecession. In 2016 it was dead even with Latin America, and may over take the US neighbors to
the south in 2017 if the trend continues. These data show that American companies continue to
invest in emerging Asian markets on a more consistent basis than they do in other regions.
Investment in Latin America has dipped and leveled off since 2012, while investment in the
Asia-Pacific has continued upward for more than a decade.

85

“Global Foreign Direct Investment Fell 13% in 2016, but Modest Recovery Expected in 2017 - New Figures,”
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, February 1, 2017.
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1437

35

Figure 4.4 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad,U.S. Direct Investment
Position Abroad on a Historical-Cost Basis (in Millions of US$)
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While American companies were investing in the Asia-Pacific, Asian-Pacific companies
were investing in the United States more than any other developing region in the world. Figure
1.5 shows the steady growth of Asian-Pacific investment into the U.S. since 2000. This growth
then continued onward to 2016 when it reached its highest level. Asian-Pacific countries
investing in the U.S. benefits the American economy by creating jobs and demand for capital
produced by local suppliers, i.e. American companies.86 According to the International Trade
Administration’s Office of Trade and Economic Analysis, foreign firms, due to FDI, either
directly or indirectly employ 12 million (8.5 percent) of the U.S. labor force.87
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Figure 4.5 Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.,Foreign Direct
Investment Position in the United States on a Historical-Cost
Basis (in Millions of US$)
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Foreign investment into the Asia-pacific from the U.S. and the rest of the world was
strong leading up to the implementation of the pivot policy in 2011 and continued after it. Even
investment from the Asia-Pacific into the U.S. followed this trend. These trends gave evidence to
the Obama Administration that these investment opportunities in both directions would continue
and that the United States should allocate resources to facilitate them. These opportunities would
then benefit America economically, which was a part of the original assumption of the region
benefiting the United States.
Another reason that makes the Asia-Pacific an increasingly important region that could
provide further justification for the first assumption of the pivot policy relates to diplomacy. It
revolves around the growing collective power of the Asia-Pacific region in international politics.
The Asia-Pacific region has increasingly gained influence in international organizations, most
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notably the United Nations (U.N.), which is making it more relevant in international decisionmaking processes.
The U.N. is the main international organization recognized by countries of the world. It is
a place where member states come together to tackle the most challenging issues facing the
world. International rules and norms are established within its resolutions and it provides a forum
where every nation can have its voice heard. While there is debate on the effectiveness of the
U.N. and its functions,88 it does have considerable power to fund various humanitarian aid and
development programs, and establish rules and norms.
The main deliberative body within the U.N. is the General Assembly (GA), which
comprises 193 member states with an equal voice and vote. This is then subdivided into several
subcommittees on topics such as international security, economic development, social
development, and cultural heritage.89 The GA is the largest body within the U.N., is where many
of its resolutions are created, and is the formal platform for a country to express its position on
the international stage. The composition of this body has profound impacts on the agenda of the
U.N.
The Asia-Pacific region maintains a large voting bloc within the U.N. The countries that
are included in the focus regions of the pivot policy make up 19 percent of the countries in the
GA.90 The Asia-Pacific region is the second-largest voting bloc within the GA right behind the
continent of Africa, which makes up 24 percent.91 In addition to voting bloc size, these Asia88
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Pacific countries also accounted for 21 percent of total asset contribution to the U.N. in 2011.92
This is a larger contribution than the more numerous members of the African region and the
smaller Latin America and Caribbean region, which makes up 1.11 percent and 5.44 percent in
2010, respectively.93 By 2017, the Asia-Pacific’s contribution had risen to 24 percent.94 The
African and Latin America and Caribbean regions increased their contributions to 1.34 percent
and 8 percent in 2017, respectively.95 The only other regions or countries that contribute more to
the U.N. than the Asia-Pacific are Western Europe and the United States.
The large voting share in the GA and the large financial contributions to the U.N. as a
whole can lead to greater influence on the international stage for the Asia-Pacific region. If a
country or a group of countries working on a resolution wants it to pass within the GA, they will
most likely need the support of some of the Asia-Pacific countries. This gives the Asia-Pacific
countries advantage with policymaking, which could increase the chances of them furthering
their agendas in the international realm. In addition, contributing as a group a large portion of the
U.N. budget, the Asia-Pacific countries are sources of potential funding that other member
nations may approach for assistance with the financial aspects of a resolution. Just as in the case
of U.N. voting, this may give the Asia-Pacific countries more influence within the body.
Increasing diplomatic ties with the Asia-Pacific countries through the pivot policy can
help the United States tap into the growing influence of this region in international politics.
Having good relations with a large voting bloc within the U.N. can assist the United States in
passing resolutions it wants to see succeed, or blocking the passage of resolutions it does not.
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Deeper relationships with these nations can help the United States convince them to lobby other
nations on behalf of the United States in order to further its agenda, and vice versa.
Strong rapport with such a large financial bloc provides larger potential funding sources
for projects the United States pursues. In addition, since the Asia-Pacific region is becoming
such a large part of the global economy, being able to have this region back economic sanctions
may increase the effectiveness of those sanctions. This is extremely valuable, as economic
sanctions are one of the main enforcement mechanisms of the U.N.96
In addition to the U.N., Asia-Pacific nations are gaining strength in international
organizations like the G20. Of the members that met in Hamburg in 2017, Asian-Pacific states
account for six of them, with Singapore invited to participate by the German Presidency (the host
of the 2017 summit) and Vietnam representing APEC.97 Eight Asian-Pacific nations attended the
G20 summit in 2017, which is an increase from the seven that attended in 2011.
The first fundamental assumption of the Pivot to Asia is that turning to Asia specifically
will benefit the United States. As shown throughout this section, at the time of the construction
of the pivot policy and following its initial implementation, the Asia-Pacific is a region that
continues to grow in economic and diplomatic influence when compared to other developing
regions of the world. The Asia-Pacific region maintained a higher aggregate GDP, GDP growth,
and attracted greater amounts of FDI through the first decade of the twenty-first century than
other developing regions. This history of economic strength gave the Obama Administration
reasonable justification to assume that increasing American involvement in the region would
provide more economic opportunities for the U.S. than other regions of the world. The
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continuing trend of the Asia-Pacific’s economic strength and growth beyond the initial
enactment of the pivot policy only provides further evidence that the Administration was correct
in their assumption. Add in the growing diplomatic and financial influence of the Asia-Pacific in
the U.N. and international politics compared to other regions, and it appears as though deeper
relations with the Asia-Pacific region could benefit the United States in the pursuit of its agenda
in the international order.
Evidence of the growing economic power and diplomatic influence of the Asia-Pacific region
was available to the Obama Administration during the design of the pivot policy and during the
start of its official implementation in 2011. Due to this, it was reasonable to assume the AsiaPacific had great potential benefits and increasing American focus on the region could benefit
the United States economically and diplomatically. The continuation of these positive trends
after 2011 only supports the original assumption of the Obama Administration.
5. China
As stated earlier, the second assumption is broken up into two parts. The first is that the
relationship with China was central to the Pivot and the second is that the Pivot is not a counter
to China. Both Secretary Clinton and Tom Donilon dedicated a large amount of time to outlining
the U.S.-Chinese relationship,98 showing that they viewed it as the most important relationship in
the Asia-Pacific region. The questions this section will answer are whether the Pivot policy
needed China in order to work or function and was it the most important nation in the Pivot
policy. Then, this section will address the other part of this assumption, namely that the Pivot
was not a counter to China. Was it a counter? Was it reasonable for the Obama Administration to
assume that it would not be perceived as a counter to China?
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As will be shown, the answers to the questions relevant to these two parts demonstrate
that, yes, China was crucial to the pivot policy and that it was correct of the Administration to
assume that. Second, it was reasonable for the Administration to assert that the Pivot policy was
not a counter to China. However, that debate will always be there simply due to the high-profile
nature of the Pivot policy and the rise of China. Subsequent actions and policies undertaken by
the administration only served to fuel this debate among analysts and contradicted the assertion
that the Pivot policy was not intended to counter China.
Historically, China has been the power center in the Asia-Pacific region. Even during the
century of humiliation99 and colonial domination by Western powers, China maintained
economic dominance in the region until the rise of imperial Japan. After the fall of communism,
China started to regain its central position in the Asia-Pacific region. Now it is the largest and
most powerful country in the region by almost every measure. Not counting Russia,100 it is the
largest country in the Asia-Pacific in land area at just over 3.7 million square miles (India is
second at just over 1.2 million square miles) and has the largest population at 1.37 billion people
(a third of the region’s total population).101 It is the largest economic power in the Asia-Pacific,
making up 34.5 percent of total GDP output from region in 2011 and 44.1 percent in 2016.102
China accounted for 46.6 percent of total FDI inflows into the region in 2011 and 31.5 percent in
2016. In terms of trade, China is either the largest or the second largest trading partner for a
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majority of the countries in the Asia-Pacific.103 In 2011, Asian economies sent about 14 percent
of their exports to China alone and about 13 percent in 2014.104
China has the largest military in the Asia-Pacific. It has the world’s largest ground army
with an active-duty force of 2.3 million, 6,457 combat tanks, 4,788 armored fighting vehicles,
and 1,271 fighter aircraft.105 Along with sheer numbers, it also has superior quality in terms of
military technology, weapons, and training.106 In addition, China is the only nation, besides
North Korea and Russia, with nuclear weapons. Due to its vast size, economic and military
power compared to other Asia-Pacific nations, China has considerable influence in the region.
This influence is most evident in the reaction of other Asian-Pacific nations to the Pivot
policy. With the announcement of the Pivot policy, many Asian nations expressed cautious
optimism, especially in regards to the security dimension of the Pivot policy.107 Most Asian
countries welcome more U.S. involvement in the region but they also worry about being caught
in major power competition between the U.S. and China. Cozying up to the U.S. or pursuing
policies that can be perceived as not in the best interest of China could lead to negative
repercussions from China. For example, in 2016, relations between China and Singapore started
to grow colder. China started to become critical of Singapore and even seized a ship carrying
Singaporean military vehicles and equipment in Hong Kong in November of the same year.108
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Some analysts see this as retaliation by China for Singapore’s continued involvement in the Pivot
policy.109
Another example of China using its economic and diplomatic influence in the region can
be seen in its response to the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) in South Korea. China opposes the deployment of THAAD in South Korea because it
fears its radar could penetrate its air space and track its military assets, posing a threat to its
national security.110 In response to its deployment, China used its position as South Korea’s
largest trading partner to punish South Korea. China placed restrictions on South Korean
businesses in China, restricted Chinese tourism to South Korea, and even canceled several
concerts and tours by K-Pop groups.111
These are examples of how China can use its power within the region to influence the
actions of other Asian nations. Even strong U.S. allies such as South Korea are still vulnerable
due to China’s strength and influence in the region, not to mention less powerful Southeast Asian
nations like Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, etc. The fact of the matter is that Asian nations have to
consider China’s reaction to their relations with major powers, especially the United States. For
Asian nations, the United States is a whole ocean away, while China is right next door.112
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Due to this geopolitical reality understood by many Asian-Pacific nations, any U.S.
policy formulated for the region must consider China, not out of fear of China, but simply
because China is deeply woven into the economic and diplomatic fabric of the region. Other
nations will consider the China question regardless, so the United States must ask that question,
too. This is why it was correct for Secretary Clinton and Tom Donilon to make the relationship
with China central to the Pivot. China has to be involved, or at least its response considered,
because it will always be the looming dragon in the room.
The question now is where to lead the U.S.-China relationship.113 This leads into the
second part of this premise of the Pivot policy: the Pivot to Asia is not a counter to China. As
soon as the details of the pivot policy were revealed to the public, foreign policy analysts jumped
on the question regarding whether the Pivot policy was intended to counter a rising China and
was meant to contain it.114 The Chinese reaction to the Pivot policy was certainly one of concern
over this issue of countering.115
As discussed before, Secretary Clinton, Tom Donilon, and the Obama Administration as
a whole, went to great lengths to dispel this counter-balance notion.116 To assert this is not
unreasonable, because the Pivot does not have to be a policy that is meant to counter-balance
China. It is then up to the Administration to follow through on that. Policies within the Pivot
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have to reflect this premise. Unfortunately, there were some big choices that the Obama
Administration made that directly contradicted this premise they so zealously defended.
For the better part of the past 20 years, there has been a debate about the rise of China.
This debate examines how China will interact with other major powers and how those major
powers will react to China. The debate mainly revolves around the question of whether China
will rise peacefully or if it is inevitable that it will come into conflict with established powers
like the United States. Realists like John Mearsheimer contend that China is seeking to maximize
its security within its region, and thus competition between it and the established power (the
United States) is indeed unavoidable.117 Many foreign policy analysts subscribe to this argument
based on recent behavior viewed as China trying to carve out hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
region.
The main behavior analysts point to suggest this. The first is increasing Chinese
aggressiveness in the South China Sea where they are attempting to enforce their territorial claim
on the entirety of it by building artificial islands with both commercial and military
capabilities.118 China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) policy is an initiative that seeks to
establish a modern equivalent of the old Silk Road.119 The OBOR policy wants to revitalize the
old Silk Road Economic Belt through Central Asia and seeks to create a Twenty-first Century
Maritime Silk Road connecting the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and then
into the Mediterranean (Figure 5.1). Analysts suggest that China’s initiatives in the SCS and
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OBOR show their increasing efforts to shape the international and economic rules and norms in
the Asia-Pacific region.120 Asia-Pacific nations worry about this potential conflict and China’s
rise, which has led some to use the pivot policy as a way for them to hedge against it.121

Figure 5.1 Source: Xinhua News Agency
With a climate such as this about the rise of China as a dominant hegemon and the
potential for conflict between it and the United States, the U.S. has to realize that anything it
does in the Asia-Pacific will be analyzed through this debate in some way, whether by analysts
or potential allies. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. carefully considers the impact of its
decisions because there is a high chance that a move may be perceived as a counter to China,
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which then would exacerbate the anxieties of China (fearing domination by a foreign power) and
other Asian nations (about being caught between the U.S. and China). This exacerbation could
thus undermine U.S. efforts in the region.
There were decisions that the Obama Administration made in the Pivot policy that
aggravated these precise anxieties and undermined the premise that the Pivot policy was not
designed to counter China. The first of these was the choice not to initially invite China to join
the TPP negotiations. This decision was viewed as an indication that the U.S. sought to push
China out of economic development in the Asia-Pacific. This particular view was held by China
especially.122 Although the U.S. officially invited China to the TPP in 2012, Secretary Clinton
indicated it would have to meet the extremely high standards of the agreement, which some
analysts saw as being put into place to block China from entering into the negotiations
anyways.123 The inclusion of this condition could possibly signal that the U.S. was not even
willing to negotiate with China on the issue.
In 2016, former President Barack Obama wrote an Op-Ed in the Washington Post, in
which he further undermines the premise that the Pivot policy was not meant to counter China.
In this piece, he argues China’s economic initiatives in the region undermine America’s interests
and its economy.124 He goes on to assert that the TPP will serve to help the U.S. maintain its
economic position in the Asia-Pacific and will allow the U.S., not China, to “write the rules” of
global trade.125 This rhetoric completely contradicts the notion that the U.S. does not seek to curb
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or counter Chinese influence in the region, or globally for that matter. This rhetoric, the decision
not to not initially include China in the TPP negotiations, and the once invited, increasing then
barriers of entry into negotiations for China only served to perpetuate the notion that the U.S.
was seeking to counter China in the region.
The second decision the Obama Administration made that undermined this premise of
was the choice not to invest in the Chinese-led Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).
This was followed by the subsequent decision to lobby other nations to withdrawn or not invest
in the AIIB. The AIIB is a development bank that began with twenty-one Asian nations in
October 2014 and lends money to build roads and communications infrastructure in developing
regions of Asia.126 The AIIB now consists of thirty-eight “regional members,” which includes
nations from across South, Southeast, and East Asia. It also has twenty “Non-regional members,”
which mainly consist of countries from Europe and Africa.
The official reason why the United States opposed the AIIB is that it would not follow
international best practices such as standards on human rights and environmental protections.127
However, analysts say the U.S. opposition was purely because the AIIB was a Chinese initiative
and that it would help China direct the economic agenda of the Asia-Pacific.128 This follows
President Obama’s rhetoric of wanting the United States, not China, to play that agenda setting
role. There were also concerns of the U.S. Congress’ willingness to allocate funds for the AIIB if
the U.S. joined, but this still could not have stopped the U.S. from supporting the idea of the
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AIIB. 129 To further compound the initial mistake of not joining the AIIB, the U.S. then
proceeded fervently to lobby its allies not to invest, citing the same reasons it used to justify its
opposition to joining in the first place.130
The reasons why the U.S. would not join the AIIB could not be supported due to the
following. The terms of the AIIB were always open for negotiation and China worked with other
nations to improve on the initiative. In addition, a plethora of U.S. allies like Western European
nations signed onto the AIIB. Traditionally, these allies would be just as concerned about many
of the reasons the U.S. cited for not joining the AIIB, yet they still signed onto the agreement.
Some analysts agreed that there were areas to improve upon with the AIIB, but overall the
United States was better off working with it to improve it rather than sitting on the sidelines.131
These facts paint the U.S. decision not to join the investment bank as one that is unjustified.
Thus, the decision not to join the AIIB and the subsequent lobbying of allies no to join it as well
only served to hurt America’s position in the Asia-Pacific, and only propagated the notion that
the United States was seeking to counter China with the Pivot policy.
The final decision the Obama Administration made that undermined its premise that the
pivot policy was not to counter China was its unfounded use of international maritime rules and
norms to justify inserting itself in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes. The SCS is a vital
waterway that facilitates global trade, commerce, and maritime traffic. It also may contain
extremely large natural resource and energy reserves. Due to the importance of this seaway,
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many nations have claims over areas of it. China has the most contentious claim in the form of
its Nine-Dash Line, in which China claims essentially the entirety of the SCS (Figure 5.2).132
Other nations that have claims in the SCS assert their 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) enforced in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United
States policy on the SCS disputes is based on the recognition of international maritime rules and
norms established in UNCLOS and that territorial disputes should be settled upon what lies
within the EEZ of a country.133

Figure 5.2 Source: Geopolitical Intelligence Services
The official position of the U.S. in regards to the SCS is the correct one. The policy itself
is not the problem. The U.S. should argue for a resolution of the disputes based on international
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norms and rules. The issue is the ideological foundation the U.S. is using to justify its position,
the foundation of international maritime rules and norms included in UNCLOS. UNCLOS would
be a perfectly good document to base the U.S. position off of, if only the U.S. was a ratifying
signatory to it. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, nor has it even signed the document. The
U.S. and its Navy have a tradition of adhering to UNCLOS, but adherence in spirit does not hold
the same weight as adherence as a ratifying party.
That is exactly the argument that China used against the United States when it revealed
its policy for the SCS disputes. How can the United States tell other nations to follow an
international law that it has not ratified itself?134 It does not matter if the U.S. is correct; it cannot
base its entire argument upon rules and norms established in a document that it has not ratified. If
the United States was a ratifying partner of UNCLOS then it could claim that it can act as an
arbitrating party in these disputes and has a duty to maintain freedom of navigation in
international waters. However, since it is not, it seems like the U.S. is becoming involved in
something that it cannot justify being a part of, other than by claiming they have economic and
security interests in a resolution of the conflict.135 This only complicated the situation and
increased the perception that the U.S. is trying to counter China in the Asia-Pacific.
It goes without saying though, China is hardly an innocent in this regard as well.
Although China is a ratifying member of UNCLOS, is regularly does not adhere to the rules and
norms it sets. This is especially true when China’s national interests are at stake, like its interest
in having control in the SCS. Upon ratification of UNCLOS, China submitted a declaration that
allowed it to exercise its sovereignty over territorial land and offshore islands that include many
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of the SCS island chains.136 This allows China, from their perspective, to ignore EEZs when it
deals with areas that China believes is in its direct national interest. This exemption contradicts
the essence of UNCLOS and undermines China’s authority in regards to the SCS. The United
States could use that as a counter argument when China accuses them of not being a party to
UNCLOS, but overall the best course of action would be for the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS so that
it can claim to have authority as an arbitrating party.
In China, the initial official government reaction to the Pivot policy was described as
muted and restrained.137 Chinese government officials approached the Pivot policy with calls for
engagement and cooperation as equals in the region. Outside of government, in Chinese news
and academic communities, the reaction to the Pivot policy came in two forms. First, the pivot
policy was meant to contain China and was offensive in nature. Second, the Pivot was a strategic
response to China’s rise and wasn’t necessarily designed to contain her.138 The majority of
Chinese news outlets and scholars subscribed to the former argument rather than the latter, and
perpetuated the perception that the Pivot was meant to counter China.
When formulating foreign policy for the Asia-Pacific, no matter the dimension, China
will have to be considered. China has an economic or diplomatic stake in almost every corner of
the region. Countries in the region understand this reality and will adjust their foreign policy to
reflect it accordingly. Due to this, it is imperative for the United States to realize this geopolitical
actuality. Fortunately, with the Pivot to Asia, the Obama Administration did recognize this and
correctly articulated China’s importance and role in the pivot policy.
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Where the Obama Administration faltered was in the contradictory nature of its rhetoric
and its actual policy towards China. The administration desperately did not want the Pivot policy
to be perceived as a counter to China and for good reason. This perspective would certainly
increase tensions between the U.S. and China, which would make achieving the goals of the
pivot policy more difficult. Nevertheless, policy choices such as leaving China out of the initial
negotiations of the TPP, not investing the Chinese-led AIIB and then lobbying other countries
not to invest in it, and involvement in the SCS disputes that were not fully supported by
international law all contributed to perpetuating the notion that the United States was seeking to
counter China. It may actually be true that the United States was not seeking to counter China
with the Pivot policy, but certain actions it took contradicted that premise and undermined the
Administration’s rhetoric, furthering the debate about the rise of China.
6. The Middle East Card
As with the second, the third assumption of the Pivot policy contains two parts—the
United States will be able to significantly drawn down its presence in the Middle East, and the
Pivot cannot happen unless this draw down takes place. To President Obama this goal served two
purposes. Withdrawing from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan functioned as a major campaign
promise, but it also became something that was necessary to the preservation of his foreign
policy legacy. After the revision to the Pivot policy by Tom Donilon, it became more apparent
that the Administration depended upon the draw down to then be able to reallocate those
resources necessary for the Pivot policy.
The third assumption turned out to be one of the most important calculations that the
Administration was counting on to be correct, even more so that the other two. For the grand
ambitions of the Pivot policy to come to fruition, the Obama Administration needed the
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diplomatic, economic, and military resources used in the Middle East, for the Asia-Pacific.
However, as we saw in the second assumption, actions taken by the Obama Administration
undermined their own premise. It was not necessarily the flare-ups of crisis in the Middle East
that harmed the validity and credibility of the Pivot policy. Any administration must be able to
plan for those contingencies, especially in a region as volatile as the Middle East. As one foreign
policy analyst put it, a government must be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. 139
Instead, the Obama Administration, with the Middle East draw down and the Pivot to Asia, tried
to walk, chew gum, juggle, and navigate an obstacle course all at the same time.
If by now it is not clear, the Pivot to Asia was an extremely massive foreign policy
endeavor. In the five years since its official roll out and the end of Obama’s second term, a
number of significant events transpired from the TPP, military exercises, redeployment of
military assets, our involvement in several Asian multilateral institutions, bilateral negotiations,
rapprochement with Burma, thawing of relations with Vietnam, and building a new relationship
with the traditionally non-aligned nation of India. It cannot be overstated how ambitious the
Pivot policy was. Secretary Clinton meant it when she said the U.S. was going to utilize
“forward-deployed diplomacy” that would use every level of government, reach every corner of
the Asia-Pacific, and touch every changing issue in the region.140
That was back in 2011, a time when the Obama Administration was kicking the Pivot to
Asia into high gear. It was also a time when the Administration was trying to reduce its military
and diplomatic presence in the Middle East. At the same time, several issues were going on in
the Middle East. Violence from the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria (Syria quickly devolving into
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a civil war), the Israeli-Hamas conflict due to cross-border attacks, the Iran nuclear issue heating
up, and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi becoming the leader of ISIS (which then becomes a real issue two
years later) all occur within a relatively short span of time. This not even to mention that 2011
saw the peaking of troop levels in Afghanistan as well as the exit from Iraq. 141 The Obama
Administration was trying juggle many foreign policy issues during this time.
Even with the arms-length strategy of coalition building and encouraging states in the
region to tackle the problems in the Middle East,142 these issues required U.S. attention and
involvement. The United States needed to stabilize these types of problems before they took on a
major endeavor such as the Pivot to Asia. Relying on this coalition strategy in a region that is
notoriously fragile, divisive, and unstable politically,143 especially after the Arab Spring rocked it
to the core and the breakdown of Syria and Iraq after ISIS swept the Middle East, may have been
hoping for too much. If the United States was going to draw down its presence in the Middle
East like the Obama Administration wanted, it needed to complete most of the planned draw
down before committing to a policy like the Pivot to Asia. The problem is not so much whether
the United States could draw down its presence in the Middle East; it did in Iraq and the
surrounding region. The problem is that the plan it had for maintaining a presence in the Middle
East was not feasible due to the various, extremely complicated problems that the United States
should not have left to the devices of a fractured Middle East to solve. After the break down of
Syria and Iraq, the Administration was stuck between the Middle East and Asia. The U.S. needed
141
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to address the issues in the Middle East but was already committed to the Pivot policy. As critics
explained, the limbo the Administration found itself in made many Asian nations question the
American commitment to the Pivot policy.144
As said before, crises are going to happen, especially in a region with a tumultuous
history like the Middle East. One cannot fault the Obama Administration for its inability to
prevent a crisis from happening. The miscalculation that happened here was that the plan Obama
left for the Middle East was not realistic. When that strategy broken down and was unable to
cope with the problems that arose, it left the Administration in a bit of a scramble to reorient
itself. Trying to rush back to the issues of the Middle East while undertaking the Pivot policy in
the Asia-Pacific is like trying to perform a full court press with one team on two basketball
courts that are not even in the same building.
This miscalculation regarding the effectiveness of its Middle East policy then affected
the second part of this assumption—the Pivot to Asia cannot happen without the drawdown in
the Middle East. As articulated best by Tom Donilon,145 the plan was to reallocate resources used
in the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific and other regions. This did not happen. Various forms of
U.S. aid to the region did not decrease in the Middle East and aid did not increase in the AsiaPacific. Money spent on war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not decrease significantly either,
as the Obama Administration had hoped.
U.S. security assistance to the Middle East increased between 2010 and 2015, from $6.7
billion to $8 billion. Comparatively, assistance to Southeast Asia decreased during that time,
from $182.1 million in 2010 to $147.6 million in 2015.146 This disparity is also evident in total
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planned U.S. aid to the respective regions. In 2010, the U.S planned for $8.49 billion in aid for
the Middle East and Afghanistan. For the Asia-Pacific it was just $2.85 billion. In 2015 aid
jumped to $14.33 billion for the Middle East and Afghanistan, while the Asia-Pacific was only
allocated $1.75 billion.147
The disparity of U.S. aid between the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific is stark and hurt
the potential success of the Pivot policy. Due to being drawn back into the Middle East, the
Obama Administration was unable to take some of that security and economic assistance out of
the Middle East and put it into the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, a report from Brown University
estimates the cost of the wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan around $4.79 trillion since the
start of the Afghanistan War in 2001.148 This study not only accounts for the costs of the actual
operations in the two wars, but also for spending by other departments in the name of national
security in relation to these two wars. Additionally, it also accounts for future projections of
medical spending for veterans of the wars.149
The amount the United States has spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
other Middle East conflicts is staggering. These costs, along with the disparity in assistance
spending between the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, could have certainly led the Obama
Administration to believe that this money could be spent more wisely, especially in a region that
has as much positive potential as the Asia-Pacific (as discussed in chapter 4). This part of the
premise, that the Pivot cannot happen without the drawdown, was partly correct for the
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Administration to assume. In an absolute sense, the Pivot policy did happen without the addition
of part of these funds from the Middle East. But the absence of these resources probably hurt the
overall success and depth of the Pivot policy. It is difficult to say how much this re-allocation
would have affected the pivot policy, but it is reasonable to say that it would have benefited from
it based on the amount spent.
This impatience with the timing of the Pivot policy might be attributable to the pressure
the Obama Administration felt with these two issues. Obama spent most of his first term
focusing on various domestic issues, such as recovering from the 2008 recession and passing the
2010 Affordable Care Act. It is only with the start of his second term do we see the roll out and
implementation of major foreign policy goals such as the Middle East draw down and the Pivot
to Asia. The pressure of completing, or at least solidifying, his legacy in these two areas is a
great deal to pack into one term, even if one has zero domestic issues to confront. It goes without
saying that this sense of urgency may have expedited the Administration’s efforts in a fashion
that it was unable to keep up with or fulfill using existing resources.
The final premise of the pivot policy was good on paper. The Obama Administration
wanted to focus more on a region that had great potential to benefit the United States (the AsiaPacific), while moving away from a region that had been seen as a drain on the U.S. and its
resources (the Middle East). The U.S. would draw down its resources in the Middle East and
stabilize it through coalition building. This would free up the billions spent in the region to help
bolster the Pivot policy efforts. This would bring more economic opportunity and a great
position for the United States in the growing power center of the world.
Unfortunately, the premise of the Pivot Policy was not the main issue. Based on
information that the Administration would have had internally about resources spent in the
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Middle East at the time it was reasonable to believe this was the right course of action. The
problem was the Administration’s execution of their Middle East strategy and the Pivot to Asia.
The Middle East strategy was flawed from the beginning given the fractured history of the
region, and timing the Pivot policy at the exact time the Administration as trying to stabilize the
Middle East stretched resources too thin. The Obama Administration may have jumped the gun
too quickly on the Pivot policy and tried to do too much at one time. These policy choices were
the downfall of this assumption, not so much the assumption itself.
7. Looking Forward
The underlying premises of the Pivot to Asia were important because they justified
different aspects of the Pivot policy. It is just as important to understand these sorts of
assumptions of a policy because they represent the “why” of a policy. If one can understand the
why, he or she can have a glimpse into the thought process the architects of a policy have when
constructing it. The premises are the foundation of a policy and if these are not met, then the
policy fractures and parts of it can crumble.
This is evident in the Pivot to Asia Policy and the three assumptions outlined in this
thesis. The first premise, that focusing on the Asia-Pacific will benefit the United States, is the
most basic and fundamental of the lot. The Administration argued that the Asia-Pacific presents
more opportunity and potential to benefit the United States economically, diplomatically, and for
its national security. The Asia-Pacific region has accounted for a third of global GDP for the
better part of a decade, has been growing at a faster rate than other regions of the world, and has
been subject to greater inflows and outflows of investment than other developing regions of the
world. It also has seen a growth in influence and power in international organizations and
institutions. Due to these facts, the United States could grow economically and gain increasingly
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more powerful allies by investing more in the Asia-Pacific. It was reasonable for the Obama
Administration to make this assumption.
The second premise, the China issue, was just as important as the first premise because of
the central position of China in the region. China is dominant in every dimension—economic,
diplomatic, and military, which gives it considerable influence in the region. This is evident in
how other Asia nations express the need to consider the China question in their foreign policy, as
well as China using its influence in the region to express displeasure with certain policies and
actions of other nations (Singapore and South Korea). The Obama Administration correctly
identified the centrality of China in the region and to the Pivot policy. However, this premise was
contradicted by actions the Administration took that furthered the allegation that the U.S. was
attempting to counter China through the Pivot policy. Actions like leaving China out of the TPP,
not investing the Chinese-led AIIB, and inserting itself into territorial disputes in the South
China Sea based on the tenets of UNCLOS that the U.S. has not ratified all contributed to
incubating anxieties about great power conflict between the U.S. and China. This ultimately hurt
the Pivot policy and undermined the Administration’s own premise.
The final premise of the Pivot policy, the Middle East draw down, went the way of the
China premise. Just as it was correct for the Administration to assume that China was central to
the Asia-Pacific, so, too, was it correct for it to assume the resources spent in the Middle East
could be more efficiently spent in the Asia-Pacific due to the opportunity there. Billions more in
aid was being spent in the Middle East when compared to the Asia-Pacific, not to mention the
potential trillions spent on the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Middle Eastern countries.
With the sheer amount of money spent in the Middle East, a reduction of this spending could
have freed up money that could have positively contributed to the Pivot policy.
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Nevertheless, as with the China premise, actions taken by the Administration undermined
the basis of the assumption. The arms-length and coalition approach undertaken by the Obama
Administration that aimed to have Middle East countries solve their problems together was
flawed. The volatile and fractured political nature of the Middle East made this coalition building
difficult, and ultimately caused the U.S. to divert attention back to the Middle East and keep
spending resources in the region, thus hurting the potential of the Pivot policy and undermining
one of its basic premises.

Premise
Reasonable to

Importance and
Potential Benefit of
Asia-Pacific
Yes

China is Central to
Pivot and the Pivot is
not a China Counter
Yes, but
executed poorly

Middle East DrawDown Will Benefit
the Pivot policy
Yes, but
executed poorly

The Asia-Pacific had
the potential to
benefit the U.S.
economically and
diplomatically.

The Obama
Administration
pursued policies that
contradicted and
undermined its ability
to engage China
while perpetuating
the argument that the
Pivot policy was to
counter China.

The Obama
Administration’s
miscalculation with
its Middle East policy
prevented a
drawdown of
resources from the
Middle East. The
simultaneous timing
of the Pivot and the
drawdown stretched
the administration
thin.

Assume?
Summary

Table 7.1 Summary of the Basic Premises of the Pivot to Asia
Based on an analysis of the three basic premises of the Pivot to Asia, the idea of the pivot
policy was correct. Its basic premises were indeed viable. The United States needed to focus
away from the resource-draining Middle East and refocus on the growing region of the AsiaPacific. The Asia-Pacific had more potential to benefit the U.S. than other regions, China was
central to the Pivot and the Pivot did not have to be about countering China, and a draw down in
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the Middle East would have benefited the initiative. Even many critics of the Pivot had that were
discussed in section 3.2 did not have issues with this. The idea of the Pivot was not the issue.
What happened to the pivot policy was that the Obama Administration made specific policy
choices that undermined its own premises and the foundation that formed them.
These choices point to a larger lesson of foreign policy. It is difficult to predict other
countries policy ambitions, let alone control them. It is also too difficult to predict crises like the
expansion of ISIS or the complete and utter breakdown of the state of Syria that would throw a
wrench in the machine. What can be controlled are the actions and policy choices of one’s own
country. The actions and choices made by one’s government can be crafted in a way that will
minimize the negative affects they have on the overall strategy. In the case of the Pivot policy,
specific choices made by the Obama Administration caused unnecessary negative effects on the
otherwise sound, from the standpoint of its major premises, Pivot policy. It is easier to explain
the ineffectiveness of a policy based on hard to manage or predict variables. It is much more
difficult to explain this when it was caused by a variable that was completely within a state’s
control.
There are a couple recommendations regarding the future of U.S. Asian-Pacific policy
that follow from the foregoing analysis. First, the U.S. should continue to build upon the
precedent that the Pivot policy provided. The Obama Administration succeeded in making a case
for the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. foreign policy. This set a precedent that
brought Asia-Pacific policy to the forefront of American politics. What analysts argue was the
most successful dimension of the Pivot policy, the diplomatic portion, should continue to be
developed by future administrations. This would allow for the building of relationships that
could then facilitate negotiations regarding more complicated issues in the economic and security
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realms. The Obama Administration set the diplomatic standard for the Asia-Pacific and it should
be sustained.
Second, the U.S. needs to redefine what engagement with China should look like. The
Obama Administration’s approach towards China was one of critical optimism. The
Administration called for cooperation in traditional areas such as green energy and climate
change, while not being shy in offering sharp criticism in other areas such as trade and cyber
security. While China is in no way a victim here, there are grave concerns that should be
addressed regarding human rights, trade, and cyber security issues. However, there are other
areas for which the United States could praise China where it seldom does.
The United States could recognize China as an equal leader and power on the world
stage, rather than as a country that must follow its lead. Seriously approaching China as a
partner, and declaring them as an equal partner, may help defeat the notion that the United States
is attempting to counter China. Domestically, this may be perceived as the United States bending
to China’s will, an interpretation that might have contributed to the previous administration’s
hesitation for implementing this sort of policy. But in the long run, this sort of recognition by the
most power country may help mend some of the distrust that has built up with the rise of China.
The Obama Administration wanted to create a lasting framework for future U.S. policy in
the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. succeeded in laying a diplomatic foundation that could be built upon
by future administrations. By keeping with the precedent set by President Obama and engaging
China as an equal power, the twenty-first century could be more than America’s pacific century;
it could be the world’s.
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